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ABSTRACT
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is typically assumed as a
voluntary initiative rather than a legal mandate. Yet, in recent years, a
growing number of countries have adopted laws that explicitly require
corporations to undertake CSR. When it comes to CSR legislation, most
scholars focus on mandatory disclosure. This article presents emergent
varieties of CSR legislation other than mandatory disclosure and investigates
the experiences of representative adopting countries. It compares and
evaluates the motivation, nature, implementation, function and potential
diffusion patterns of the emerging types of CSR legislation. This article
shows that while the new legislative methods appear progressive, politics
and the open-ended notion of CSR significantly weaken the compulsory
nature of the laws. The major function of the CSR laws as they currently
stand appears mostly expressive. At best, the explicit recognition of CSR in
the laws may send signals about appropriate corporate behavior and
reconstruct business norms that exclusively focus on profits. At worst, the
laws may be political greenwashing through which politicians give symbolic
importance to CSR. This article offers policy lessons and possible directions
for future reform.
INTRODUCTION
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is typically assumed as a
voluntary initiative rather than a legal mandate.1 However, the trend of
legalizing CSR has given rise to the oxymoron of mandatory CSR. Despite
its increasing usage,2 the notion of mandatory CSR remains vague. Different
users attach the label to somewhat different things. With the growing interest
in legal policies for CSR, there is an urgent need to analyze what is meant
by making CSR mandatory. Without clarification, the debate on whether or
not CSR should be made mandatory makes no real headway.
In a very simple sense, mandatory CSR means that the law imposes an
obligation on corporations to undertake CSR. Thus, the meaning of
mandatory CSR significantly hinges on what is meant by law and what is
meant by CSR. As to the scope of law, this article focuses on national law
1. See generally Alexander Dahlsrud, How Corporate Social Responsibility is Defined:
An Analysis of 37 Definitions, 15 CORP. SOC. RESP. & ENVT’L. MGMT. 1 (2008) (finding that
21 of the 37 CSR definitions explicitly refer to voluntariness).
2. Typing the keyword, “mandatory corporate social responsibility” with quotation
marks, Google Search returned more than 15,000 results, and Google Scholar returned 832
results, as of November 2, 2020.
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rather than international law.3 Different national systems (e.g., common law
and civil law systems) have different sources of law.4 It is fair to say that
legislation (including statutes and regulations) is the most common primary
source of law for most jurisdictions around the world. Hence, this article
focuses on mandatory CSR in the form of legislation.
Nowadays, the notion of CSR usually covers a broad spectrum of issues
in relation to business operations. For instance, the European Commission
defines CSR as “the responsibility of enterprises for their impact on society
. . . . To fully meet their corporate social responsibility, enterprises should
have in place a process to integrate social, environmental, ethical, human
rights and consumer concerns into their business operations and core strategy
. . . .”5 Accordingly, CSR legislation may take place in the form of labor
law, environmental law, consumer protection law, human rights law, etc.
Often, the subjects of labor law, environmental law and the like comprise a
wide range of actors, including individuals, business organizations, non-
governmental organizations, governments, international organizations, etc.
Such laws are not intended to target corporations specifically and often do
not make any explicit reference to CSR. For instance, the minimum wage
law applies to all employment relationships, whether or not the employer is
a corporation. Most of the laws may be regarded as implicit CSR legislation
as the laws define proper legal roles and responsibilities for social actors
including corporations.
Implicit CSR legislation can be found in virtually every jurisdiction
around the world. In comparative perspective, some countries have more
and tougher implicit CSR legislation than others. For instance, regulations
on maternal and parental benefits for employees vary wildly from country to
country.6 Within a country, implicit CSR lawmaking emerges whenever the
government raises social, labor, environmental, or human rights standards.
3. Mandatory CSR law is a more complicated issue under international law because the
subjectivity of corporate entities remains controversial in international law – a topic beyond
the scope of this article. See generally José E. Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of
International Law?, 9 SANTACLARA J. INT’L L. 1 (2011).
4. See generally Joseph Dainow, The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of
Comparison, 15 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 419 (1966) (comparing civil and common law as legal
systems).
5. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Renewed
EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility, at 6. COM (2011) 681 final (Oct.
25, 2011), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0681 [htt
ps://perma.cc/JU3E-GK9N].
6. SeeOECD,Key Characteristics of Parental Leave Systems, at 2–11, https://www.oec
d.org/els/soc/PF2_1_Parental_leave_systems.pdf [https://perma.cc/NL8D-85M2] (providing
an overview of parental leave systems across OECD and EU countries).
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Mandating CSR through implicit CSR legislation is nothing new. The
development of labor law, for example, began with the industrial revolution
in the eighteenth century.7 Mandating CSR by way of tightening labor or
environmental regulations is perhaps the least controversial way, as even
CSR critics acknowledge that the corporation shall maximize profits within
the confines of laws including labor law, environmental law, etc.8
Compared to implicit CSR legislation, explicit CSR legislation is a
relatively recent development. Over the past few decades, the world has
witnessed an emerging body of laws that specifically target corporations and
explicitly incorporate CSR or its synonyms such as “business ethics,”
“corporate citizenship,” “sustainability,” “ESG” (environmental, social,
governance), “the triple bottom line” (i.e., social, environmental and
financial performance), “business and human rights,” “responsible business
conduct,” etc.9 Explicit CSR legislation is the focus of this article.
The most common type of explicit CSR legislation is mandatory
reporting, in which companies are required to disclose extensive information
about their social and environmental plans, actions or performance. Such
disclosure is often referred to as “CSR reporting,” “sustainability reporting,”
“non-financial reporting,” “triple bottom line reporting” or “ESG
disclosure.” 10 The law requires disclosure but not substantive social or
environmental performance. Nevertheless, nowadays, sustainability
7. See generally Joanna Innes, Origins of the Factory Acts: The Health and Morals of
Apprentices Act, 1802 in LAW, CRIME ANDENGLISH SOCIETY 1660–1830 (Norma Landau ed.,
2009) (discussing how the Health and Morals Apprentices Act of 1802 served as a model for
labor regulations around the world).
8. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG (Sept. 13, 1970) https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-
doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html [https://perma.cc/MG32-A6K2].
9. See, e.g., Andrew Crane and Sarah Glozer, Researching Corporate Social
Responsibility Communication: Themes, Opportunities and Challenges 53 J. MGMT. STUD.
1223, 1223–25 (2016) (discussing CSR synonyms including “corporate sustainability,”
“corporate responsibility,” “stakeholder management” and “corporate citizenship”); Marcel
van Marrewijk, Concepts and Definitions of CSR and Corporate Sustainability: Between
Agency and Communion, 44 J. BUS. ETHICS 95, 95–96 (2003) (noting various CSR concepts
such as “sustainability development,” “corporate citizenship,” “triple bottom line” and
“business ethics”); European Union, Executive Summary of EUMulti Stakeholder Forum on
Corporate Social Responsibility (February 3-4, 2015), https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/docume
nts/8774/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native [https://perma.cc/26ZA-JQ65]
(noting CSR synonyms such as “sustainability,” “responsible business conduct” and “business
and human rights”).
10. See Global Reporting Initiative, About Sustainability Reporting https://www.globalr
eporting.org/information/sustainability-reporting/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/TNV4
-RFE3] (“Sustainability reporting can be considered synonymous with other terms for non-
financial reporting; triple bottom line reporting, corporate social responsibility (CSR)
reporting, and more.”).
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reporting itself has become part of CSR per se. CSR performance indexes
usually give an unfavorable rating to companies not engaging in
sustainability reporting.11
According to a recent report by KPMG International, Global Reporting
Initiative (GRI), United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), and
the Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa, at least sixty-four countries
in the world have introduced almost 400 sustainability reporting instruments
and more than two thirds of the instruments are mandatory regulations.12
Despite the worldwide adoption of mandatory CSR disclosure, rich
empirical evidence shows that mandatory disclosure regimes rarely achieve
their stated objectives.13 Existing empirical evidence suggests that CSR
disclosure legislation often increases information quantity but without much
improvement in quality.14
To date, most scholarly and policy attention on explicit CSR legislation
is focused on mandatory CSR disclosure.15 Yet, it is important to expand the
focus beyond disclosure and explore other possibilities, especially given the
limitations of the mandatory disclosure approach. In recent years, several
countries have been enthusiastically pushing the frontiers of CSR legislation
beyond mandatory disclosure. This article presents a variety of recent
innovations in making CSRmandatory through legislation, including the due
diligence approach in France, the philanthropy approach in Mauritius and
India, the governance structure approach in South Africa, and the general
duty approach under corporate law in China and Indonesia.
Mandating CSR through legislation raises a raft of important questions
beyond the theoretical inquiry about whether mandatory CSR is desirable.
As a matter of legal reality, how can mandatory CSR legislation be possible?
Given that CSR is conventionally understood as voluntarism, what is the
11. Donna Wood, Measuring Corporate Social Performance: A Review, 12 INT’L J.
MGMT. REV. 50, 60–65 (2010).
12. Global Reporting Initiative, Carrots and Sticks: Global Trends in Sustainability
Reporting Regulation and Policy, at 10, 12 (2016), https://www.globalreporting.org/resourc
elibrary/Carrots%20and%20Sticks-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/JMA5-MKJP].
13. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011) (noting that a series of required conditions for
mandated disclosures to succeed are rarely met, leading to dubious indirect benefits and
various costs).
14. For a review of empirical evidence, see David Hess, The Transparency Trap: Non‐
Financial Disclosure and the Responsibility of Business to Respect Human Rights, 56 AM.
BUS. L.J. 5, 33–40 (2019).
15. The body of mandatory CSR disclosure literature is large. With combined keywords
of “mandatory disclosure,” “corporate social responsibility” and “transparency,” LexisNexis
returned 293 U.S. law review articles, and Google Scholar returned 3,260 articles, as of June
26, 2019.
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impetus to break the convention and make CSR mandatory? What is the
relationship between the CSR mandate and its pre-existing corporate law?
What is the meaning and scope of CSR defined in the law? How has the law
been implemented? What is the function of the law? Has the law made
companies more socially responsible? This article investigates the
institutional backgrounds of representative adopting countries in an attempt
to shed light on the motivation, definition, implementation, function and
possible diffusion of the recent emergent forms of mandatory CSR
legislation.
The comparison of the national experiences reveals some important
similarities and differences. Among various findings, this article shows that
the governments are often motivated to pursue their own interests unrelated
to labor, environmental or human rights protection. The non-CSR related
motivations, such as appeasing political allies, shaming political enemies,
and unloading welfare burdens to corporations, play a critical role in enacting
the laws. The political interests of the governments carry far more weight
than the nature of the pre-existing corporate law (whether shareholder-
oriented or stakeholder-oriented) in explaining the adoption of the
mandatory CSR laws. Although the CSR laws appear mandatory, politics
and the open-ended notion of CSR significantly weaken the compulsory
nature of the laws. At least for now, the major function of the mandatory
CSR laws appears largely expressive rather than regulatory or adjudicative.
At best, the laws may send signals about appropriate corporate behavior and
potentially lead to reconstruction of business norms that prioritize economic
interests over social and environmental concerns. At worst, the mandatory
CSR laws, as they currently stand, may be exploited as a political signaling
device through which politicians send a symbolic message to their
constituents that they care about society and nature. In other words, it could
be nothing more than political greenwashing.
This article proceeds as follows. Sections I-IV present emerging types
of explicit CSR legislation and take an institutional perspective to discuss
the experiences of the representative adopters under each type. Given the
national experiences, Section V provides an assessment of the impetus,
coverage, definition, implementation, function, potential diffusion and
reform direction of the emerging CSR laws.
I. MANDATORYCSRDUEDILIGENCE
CSR is increasingly understood as a management process. For
example, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
defines CSR as “a management concept whereby companies integrate social
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and environmental concerns in their business operations and interactions
with their stakeholders.”16 This kind of CSR definition inspires process-
oriented CSR laws. The essence of mandatory CSR due diligence is to
require companies to identify social and environmental risks associated with
its business operation and establish and execute reasonable plans to prevent
harms resulting from the identified risks. France’s duty of vigilance law,
adopted in 2017, is a pioneer of this approach. This type of law is gaining
traction in Europe.17
A. National Experience: France
The French duty of vigilance law emerged in a wave of responsible
supply chain initiatives. Unlike California 2012 Transparency in Supply
Chains Act and UK 2015 Modern Slavery Act, which merely mandate
disclosure of voluntary due diligence efforts in global supply chains (or the
absence thereof),18 the French duty of vigilance law takes a step further,
requiring due diligence and imposing legal liability in case of ineffective
implementation resulting in damages.
The French duty of vigilance law is the result of a lengthy and persistent
campaign by NGOs, trade unions, and left-wing parliament members. For
years, many French NGOs and trade unions had called for the government
to act over corporate irresponsibility related to globalization. During the
2012 presidential campaign, François Hollande of the Socialist Party, in
response to an electoral appeal made by NGOs, pledged to “establish a law
16. UNIDO, What is CSR?, https://www.unido.org/our-focus/advancing-economic-
competitiveness/competitive-trade-capacities-and-corporate-responsibility/corporate-social-
responsibility-market-integration/what-csr [https://perma.cc/J3KJ-5NUK].
17. See Saskia Wilks, High Hopes for Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence in 2020,
BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.business-
humanrights.org/en/high-hopes-for-mandatory-human-rights-due-diligence-in-2020# [https:/
/perma.cc/8LYK-TQDS] (reviewing the development of mandatory due diligence law in
Europe); see also European Coalition for Corporate Justice, Comparative Table – mHRDD
with Corporate Liability Laws in Europe, https://www.business-humanrights.org/sites/defaul
t/files/documents/eccj_hrdd_pcl-comparative-table-2019-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/FH6H-J
GJ8] (comparing France’s duty of vigilance law, Swiss proposals, Germany’s draft law for
Human Rights and Environmental Due Diligence Act, and Dutch Child Labor Due Diligence
Law).
18. See generallyAdam S. Chilton and Galit A. Sarfaty, The Limitations of Supply Chain
Disclosure Regimes, 53 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2017) (providing an in-depth analysis of the
California Transparency Supply Chain Act and its possible effects); PwC, Responsible
Business: What Are Companies Doing To Respond To The Modern Slavery Act?, https://ww
w.pwc.co.uk/sustainability-climate-change/assets/pwc-modern-slavery-act-business-insights
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Z6L-GHQV] (providing an introduction to reporting under the
Modern Slavery Act).
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that would give effect to the responsibility of parent companies for the
actions of their subsidiaries abroad when the latter has a detrimental impact
on the environment and human health.”19 Encouraged by this commitment,
a coalition of NGOs and trade unions worked closely with a few socialist
parliament members to bring the bill onto the legislative agenda.20 The
collapse of the Rana Plaza textile factory in Bangladesh in April 2013, which
killed over a thousand workers who were hired by sub-contractors of several
global companies including French ones, gave an important impetus to turn
the political promise into a legislative bill.21 In November 2013, six months
after the disaster, the first version of the bill was put forward.
The initial bill proposed two legal innovations. First, the bill introduced
a general duty for corporations to prevent any negative impact on human
rights, health and safety, and the environment caused by their operations.
Second, the bill introduced a new liability regime where corporations would
be presumed liable unless they could prove that they had taken necessary
steps to prevent the harm. The initial bill faced tremendous opposition from
the business sector and even the Ministry for the Economy and Finance. As
a result, a second version of the bill was proposed.22
The second version significantly reduced the legal obligations for
corporations. It removed the general CSR duty and replaced it with an
obligation to produce a vigilance plan to identify risks and prevent harms to
human rights, health and safety, and the environment. While the second
version provided that companies would be liable for any harm resulting from
failure to implement the vigilance plan, the burden of proof was on claimants
rather than corporations. Moreover, it significantly narrowed the scope of
companies subject to the bill, i.e., only applicable to large corporations. The
National Assembly (the lower chamber of the parliament) adopted the
second version, but the Senate (the higher chamber) with a right-wing
majority adopted a significantly modified version referred to as the third
version.23 The third version was simply a mandatory disclosure law without
19. Friends of the Earth France and ActionAid France-Peuples Solidaires, End of the
Road for Transnational Corporations?, 6–7 (2017), https://www.amisdelaterre.org/IMG/pdf
/end_of_the_road_for_tncs_foef-aaf-oct17.pdf [https://perma.cc/LXZ5-CP56].
20. See Alice Evans, Overcoming the Global Despondency Trap: Strengthening
Corporate Accountability in Supply Chains, 27 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 658, 671–76 (2019)
(explaining why the law emerged in France but not in other European countries).
21. Id. at 667–69.
22. For a detailed account of the legislative history, see Nadia Bernaz, Unpacking the
French Bill on Corporate Due Diligence: A Presentation at the International Business and
Human Rights Conference in Sevilla, RIGHTS ASUSUAL (Oct. 21, 2016), http://rightsasusual.
com/?p=1087 [https://perma.cc/QXB9-BLD7].
23. Id.
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any liability for human rights or environmental violations.
Meanwhile, the Cabinet initially was uninterested in pursuing the bill.
Nevertheless, the Cabinet became supportive at the later stage in an attempt
to pacify the left-wing parliament members who felt aggrieved by the pro-
business labor code amendment in August 2016.24 The National Assembly
and the Senate then found a compromise and adopted the final version in
February 2017.25 However, the legal battle did not end there. More than 120
right-wing members from both chambers of the parliament appealed to the
French Constitutional Council (the highest court) to challenge the
constitutionality of the law.26 In March 2017, the court upheld most parts of
the law.27
The law, as it stands now, requires French companies that have more
than 5,000 employees in France, or more than 10,000 employees worldwide,
to develop, disclose and implement a vigilance plan in order to identify risks
and prevent severe human rights violations and environmental damage
resulting directly or indirectly from the operations of the company, its
subsidiaries or its subcontractors with whom it has an established
relationship. 28 The plan should include a mapping of risks, regular
assessment procedures, actions to mitigate risks or prevent serious breaches,
and warning and reporting mechanisms.29 In case of non-compliance with
the disclosure obligation, any interested party may give notice to the parent
company or seek injunctive relief by the court. More importantly, those
harmed by the company’s failure to establish or implement a plan may
launch a civil action and seek damages for corporate negligence.30
In 2018, large French companies were obliged to establish, publish and
implement their first vigilance plan. The government does not publish a list
of companies subject to the law. It is estimated by NGOs that there are
around 300 companies subject to the requirement.31 Available empirical
24. Evans, supra note 20, at 675.
25. Bernaz, supra note 22.
26. Evans, supra note 20, at 675.
27. The French Constitutional Council upheld the majority of the legislation but struck
down the proposed civil penalties for companies that fail to develop a diligence plan. For the
analysis of the constitutional decision, see Sandra Cossart et al., The French Law on Duty of
Care: A Historic Step Towards Making Globalization Work for All, 2 BUS. & HUM RTS. J.
317, 321–23 (2017).
28. For more details about the law, see id.
29. Id. at 320.
30. Id. at 321.
31. Friends of the Earth et al., Loi sur le devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et
entreprises donneuses d’ordre - Année 1 : les entreprises doivent mieux faire [Law on the
Duty of Care of Parent Compagnies and Contractors - Year 1: Businesses Must Do Better] 7
(2019).
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reports consistently show that most of the vigilance plans published by
companies only meet the minimal requirements of the law and lack
informative details and substantive performance.32 As noted, France’s duty
of vigilance law provides little regulatory monitoring but relies on private
actions for enforcement. The first legal action under the law emerged very
recently. In June 2019, a group of six environmental NGOs (two based in
France and four in Uganda) formally requested the French energy giant Total
to revise its vigilance plan and implementation for an oil project in Uganda.33
Total refused to change after the three-month legal deadline. Total reasoned
that the French duty of vigilance law only requires general rather than
specific risk assessment, thus claiming that it already conducted detailed
environmental and social impact assessments for the oil project under other
laws.34 The NGOs took Total to court, seeking a court order to force Total
to revise its vigilance plan and/or take any urgent measures.35 In January
2020, the court (Tribunal de Grande Instance) dismissed the application,
finding that the vigilance plan would fall in the category of disputes among
commercial companies and, as such, the appropriate venue was a commercial
court.36 The NGOs appealed to the Versailles Court of Appeals. The higher
court confirmed the view in favor of corporations that the vigilance plan was
a business management issue rather than a matter of human rights or
environmental protection.37
Under the law, those harmed by the company’s failure to establish or
32. See Juan Ignacio Ibañez et al., Devoir de Vigilance: Reforming Corporate Risk
Engagement, DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL, at 121–23 (2020) (reviewing ten empirical
studies on the implementation of the duty of diligence and conducting a new empirical study).
33. Friends of the Earth, Oil Company Total Faces Historic Legal Action in France for




35. AFP, NGOs File Suit Against Total Over Uganda Oil Project, THE EAST AFRICAN
(Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/NGOs-sue-Total-over-Uganda-
oil-project/2560-5323092-r3aeku/index.html [https://perma.cc/9K9Z-KBQC]; Total Sued
Under France’s New Duty of Vigilance Law, INTERNATIONAL DAILY NEWSWIRE (Oct. 23,
2019), https://ens-newswire.com/2019/10/23/total-sued-under-frances-new-duty-of-vigilanc
e-law/ [https://perma.cc/PMK5-VSDK].
36. Ed Reed,Win for Total in French Case over Duty of Vigilance, ENERGYVOICE (Jan.
30, 2020), https://www.energyvoice.com/oilandgas/africa/221363/win-for-total-in-french-ca
se-over-duty-of-vigilance/ [https://perma.cc/UTQ5-B4CF].
37. Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, French Court of Appeal Remands
Case Against Total Over Alleged Failure to Respect Duty Of Vigilance Law In Uganda To
Commercial Court (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/fr
ench-court-of-appeal-remands-case-against-total-over-alleged-failure-to-respect-duty-of-vig
ilance-law-in-uganda-to-commercial-court/ [https://perma.cc/SH5B-3V7T].
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implement the plan may pursue a negligence claim against the company.38
To date, no such cases have been reported. Legal commentators appear to
share the view that civil actions are an unlikely remedy for victims.39 As the
French Constitutional Court explained, civil liability is based on the ordinary
law of tort.40 In France, there are three elements necessary to establishing
tort liability: damage, a breach of duty, and causation. There is great
uncertainty with regard to the breach element. The obligation under the duty
of vigilance law is to establish and implement a vigilance plan rather than to
guarantee any actual preventive results of the plan.41 Thus, any occurrence
of harm does not imply a breach of duty. It is uncertain how to assess
whether a company has fulfilled the obligation of effective implementation
of the plan. Moreover, proving causation is a daunting task for victims.42
Lastly, while the law gives foreign victims a legal right to seek remedy from
the parent company based in France, it remains very difficult for foreigners
to access French courts given French procedural laws.43
II. MANDATORYCORPORATE PHILANTHROPY
CSR used to be seen as synonymous with corporate charity.
Accordingly, mandatory CSR could mean mandatory corporate
philanthropy. Mandatory corporate philanthropy is very controversial even
among CSR advocates. If CSR is voluntary by nature, corporate charity is
likely the very inner core of a firm’s voluntarism. Corporate donations raise
the specter of window dressing merely to improve corporate image.44 In this
regard, mandatory corporate philanthropy may be viewed as a type of
mandated public relations management. As modern CSR has expanded far
beyond corporate charity and focuses on accountable management of any
negative externalities resulting from daily business operations, corporate
philanthropy is a narrow or even outdated aspect of CSR. Nevertheless,
corporate philanthropy remains a popular (mis)understanding of CSR. There
38. Cossart et al., supra note 27, at 321.
39. See Stephane Brabant & Elsa Savourey, French Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law: A
Closer Look at the Penalties Faced by Companies, 50 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE LA
COMPLIANCE ET DE L’ÉTHIQUE DES AFFAIRES [INT’L REV. COMPLIANCE& BUS. ETHICS] 1, 3–
11 (2017).
40. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2017-750DC, Mar.
23, 2017, para 27.
41. Brabant & Savourey, supra note 39.
42. Brabant & Savourey, supra note 39.
43. Brabant & Savourey, supra note 39.
44. Inger L. Stole, Philanthropy as Public Relations: A Critical Perspective on Cause
Marketing, 2 INT’L J. COMMC’N. 20, 20 (2008).
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seems to be a growing interest in this legislative mode. Mauritius is the first
country that adopted mandatory corporate philanthropy. India and Nepal
followed suit and Nigeria is currently deliberating over such legislation.45
While mandatory philanthropy statutes vary across the countries, the gist of
this legislative mode is to require companies to commit a certain percentage
of their profits to designated CSR programs, such as programs to build
schools and to provide shelters for the poor.
A. National Experience (1): Mauritius
Mauritius is an island nation in the Indian Ocean that sequentially
experienced Dutch, French and British colonialism over the past centuries.
The country gained independence in 1968. In the decades following its
independence, Mauritius liberalized its economy and gained great economic
development. However, as the economic growth started to stall in the 1990s,
the government undertook further liberal reforms at the turn of the century.46
Meanwhile, as Mauritius remained plagued with poverty and
inequality, the government was mindful of potential negative consequences
and critiques of liberalism. To support and legitimize its liberal approach to
development, the government appealed to CSR in several policy instruments.
For instance, part of the reform was the adoption of the national code of
corporate governance in 2003, declaring the pursuit of long-term shareholder
value as the ultimate goal of the corporation.47 Notably, in the 2007 budget
speech, the Minister of Finance called for companies to contribute at least
one percent of their profits to CSR activities.48 This initial voluntary call did
not receive much response from the private sector. 49 In 2009, the
45. For India, see Section II.B. In Nepal, the 2016 Industrial Enterprise Act provides that
companies with an annual revenue of more than NRs 150 million must contribute at least one
per cent of their annual profit to CSR. Moreover, Circular issued by Nepal Rastra Bank
(NRB) requires bank and financial institutions to allocate at least one per cent of net profit to
the following categories: social projects, direct grant expenses, sustainable development goals
and/or setting up a child daycare centre for employees. For more details, see Drishti
Maharjan,Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Scenario& Implications in Nepal, BIRUWA
ADVISORS (July 9, 2018), http://biruwa.net/2018/07/corporate-social-responsibility-csr-scena
rio-implications-nepal/ [https://perma.cc/RYH2-TTN2]. For Nigeria, see Jacob Segun
Olatunji, Reps Pass Bill for Companies to Adopt Corporate Social Responsibility, NIGERIA
TRIB (July 5, 2018), https://www.tribuneonlineng.com/153855/ [https://perma.cc/NM72-6FD
R].
46. See generally Renginee Pillay, THE CHANGING NATURE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: CSR ANDDEVELOPMENT – THECASE OFMAURITIUS 202–03 (2015).
47. Code of Corporate Governance for Mauritius § 2.3.2(g).
48. Pillay, supra note 46, at 223.
49. Pillay, supra note 46, at 226.
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government escalated its efforts to turn voluntary CSR into a legal mandate
by amending the Income Tax Act of 1995. The amendment requires all
profitable companies to contribute two percent of their preceding year’s
profits towards CSR activities. 50 This mandatory CSR legislation was
spearheaded by the Minister of Finance, who was tasked with reducing the
government’s expenditures on social services while significantly lowering
tax rates for corporations.51 The government viewed national development
as a joint responsibility of the government and the private sector.52
To implement the CSR mandate, the government created the National
CSR Committee to oversee the implementation. The committee was
composed of representatives of the government, the corporate sector, and the
NGO sector. The committee issued guidelines on how companies should
use their CSR funds. Initially, the CSR guidelines provided detailed
categories of qualified and non-qualified programs and a list of approved
NGOs eligible to receive corporate donations. In July 2015, all the CSR
guidelines were abandoned, and companies were allowed to use their CSR
funds according to their own CSR agendas. As a result, many companies set
up their own NGOs and hired employees through their NGOs, strategically
claiming compliance with the CSR expenditure requirements. 53 The
government viewed this practice deceitful, replaced it with a new CSR
framework in 2016, and has made some further adjustments since then.54
Under the current CSR scheme (effective October 2019), every
profitable company in a year is required to set up a CSR fund equivalent to
two percent of its chargeable income of the preceding year, and at least
seventy-five percent of its CSR fund shall be remitted to the Ministry of
Finance. 55 The remitted CSR money is received and managed by the
National Social Inclusion Foundation (NSIF), whose council consists of
representatives from the government, the private sector, the NGO sector, and
academia.56 The NSIF channels the CSR funding to programs in priority
50. Pillay, supra note 46, at 226.
51. Ram Seegobin, The Source and Growth of the NGOPhenomenon inMauritius, LALIT
MAURITIUS (June 8, 2016), https://www.lalitmauritius.org/en/newsarticle/1869/the-source-
and-growth-of-the-ngo-phenomenon-in-mauritius-by-ram-seegobin/ [https://perma.cc/2BU6
-4CJR]; Pillay, supra note 46, at 226.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Ministry of Social Integration and Economic Empowerment of Mauritius, The New
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Framework (2016).
55. Mauritius Revenue Authority, Guide on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
(August 2019).
56. National Social Inclusion Foundation, Charter of National Social Inclusion
Foundation, at 4–10, https://www.nsif.mu/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Charter-of-the-Nati
onal-Social-Inclusion-Foundation-.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJ4Z-F4QU].
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areas such as poverty alleviation, educational support, social housing,
assistance to persons with disabilities, environmental protection, etc.57
After contributing the requisite amount to the NSIF, companies are
allowed to manage the remaining CSR money according to their own CSR
policies. In practice, large companies usually create their own CSR
programs or work with NGOs to spend the remaining CSR funds, while
small and medium-sized companies have limited resources and usually
prefer to remit all their CSR money to the NSIF.58 The NSIF acts as the
central body to receive and allocate public funds to NGOs. The foundation
maintains a list of NGOs for the fund allocation purpose. As of June 2018,
there were 370 NGOs registered with the foundation. In the fiscal year of
2017-2018, the foundation approved and allocated a total of Rs 201.8 million
(USD 5.81 million) to 230 projects proposed by 172 organizations.59 A
significant share of the approved programs (forty-four percent) were in the
priority area of educational support.60 According to the foundation, it has
consistently monitored all the funded projects and provided necessary
training to NGOs.61
The CSR scheme has aroused controversy inMauritius. The mandatory
contribution of two percent of profits to CSR activities has been viewed as a
levy. Those who oppose the CSR levy argue that it may hurt the country’s
ability to attract foreign investment and disadvantage Mauritian companies
in international competition.62 Moreover, without reliable monitoring and
credible assessment, there are concerns about the extent to which the CSR
programs, whether carried out by the NISF or companies themselves, have
fulfilled the purposes stated in the law.63
B. National Experience (2): India
India’s CSR law is closely related to its corporate law development.
India’s corporate law in the colonial period was unequivocally shareholder
focused. The 1956 Companies Act, the first corporate statute adopted after
India’s independence, also centered on shareholder interests. The corporate
57. Mauritius Revenue Authority, supra note 55; National Social Inclusion Foundation,
supra note 56.
58. Pillay, supra note 56, at 254.
59. National CSR Foundation, Annual Report 2017-2018, 16.
60. Id.
61. Id. According to the National CSR Foundation, during the period ending as of June
2018, the foundation monitored 82 percent of the 230 CSR programs, spent 600 hours on field
visits to the funded organizations and provided mentoring supports to 71 organizations.
62. Seegobin, supra note 51, at 438.
63. Pillay, supra note 46, at 258.
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law reform during the economic liberalization in the 1990s continued this
focus on shareholder interests until the Satyam scandal (commonly known
as India’s Enron scandal) in 2009, which prompted the Indian government
to revisit its regulatory regime for corporate governance.64 When reviewing
the Companies Bill in 2009, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on
Finance moved toward a stakeholder-oriented approach. The Committee
examined the extent of CSR being undertaken by Indian companies and
proposed the need for a comprehensive CSR policy.65
In addition to the pro-CSR position taken by the Parliamentary Standing
Committee, the Indian government undertook other CSR initiatives. For
instance, in late 2009, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) released the
Corporate Social Responsibility Guidelines that exhorted companies to share
the burden of the government through CSR. As the then-Minster of MCA
(Salman Khurshid) explained, “At a time when the Government is engaged
with delivery of a gigantic national development initiative and is taking a
leadership position on various global issues, I am sure that India Inc. will be
ready to walk step in step with the Government to discharge their
responsibilities towards national development.”66 However, the voluntary
guidelines appeared to have little effect — CSR activities remained
uncommon among Indian companies after the guidelines were released.67
In 2010, the government was deliberating on a new law requiring
companies to contribute at least two percent of their annual net profits to
CSR. The Indian business sector clearly opposed this proposal. Indian
business leaders were concerned not only about the appropriateness of
turning CSR into mandatory obligations but also the weakening of the
commitment to economic liberalization. 68 Ultimately, the government
adopted a compromised approach (i.e., comply or explain) in the Companies
Act, passed in August 2013.
The 2013 Companies Act shifts away from shareholder primacy and
requires directors to consider the interests of a wide range of stakeholders,
64. For the legislative history of the mandatory CSR law in India, see Afra Afsharipour,
Redefining Corporate Purpose: An International Perspective, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 465,
476–88 (2017).
65. Id.
66. Ministry of Corporate Affairs Government of India, Corporate Social Responsibility
Voluntary Guidelines 2009, at 6 (emphasis added), http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/latestne
ws/CSR_Voluntary_Guidelines_24dec2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/PPX7-SL3L]
67. Dhammika Dharmapala & Vikramaditya Khanna, The Impact of Mandated
Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from India’s Companies Act of 2013, 56 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 92, 94–95 (2018).
68. Id. at 95.
444 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OFBUSINESS LAW [Vol. 23:2
including employees, shareholders, communities, and the environment. 69
The most striking CSR provision is Section 135. It requires large companies
(defined by net worth, turnover, or net profit) to spend in every financial year
at least two percent of their average net profits made in the preceding three
years on qualified CSR programs. Each company subject to Section 135
shall establish a CSR board committee composed of three or more directors,
and at least one of the committee members must be an independent director.
The committee shall advise the board on how to spend the CSR fund and
monitor the implementation. If the company fails to spend the requisite
amount, the board shall explain the reasons for the non-compliance in the
annual report.70
The CSR expenditure law has attracted great criticism in India. Those
from the political right view the mandatory CSR expenditure as a tax against
economic liberalization, while those from the left claim the comply-or-
explain approach does not go far enough to solve inequality problems in
India.71 Moreover, as a matter of practice, the law raises questions about its
enforceability given that there is great uncertainty about the meaning of
CSR.72 While the corporate statute mentions CSR multiple times, it does not
define it. In an attempt to solve the implementation problem, the government
issued a schedule that specifies qualified CSR activities, including programs
to eradicate hunger and poverty, to promote education and gender equality,
to assist rural development projects, etc.73
According to the MCA, during the 2015-2016 financial year (the most
recent available data year as of the time of writing), 5,097 companies subject
to the CSR mandate contributed a total of 9,822 rupees crore (about $1.48
billion USD) to qualified CSR activities.74 Yet, a significant portion of the
69. The Companies Act, 2013, §166; see generally Afsharipour, supra note 64 (detailing
the reformation of India’s corporate governance within the past decade).
70. The Companies Act, 2013, §135 (5).
71. See Aneel Karnani, Mandatory CSR in India: A Bad Proposal, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION REV. (May 20, 2013), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/mandatory_csr_in_india_a_
bad_proposal [https://perma.cc/DBY5-2J4Q] (analyzing how the concept of CSR is
controversial to both sides of the political spectrum).
72. See Corporate Social Responsibility in India: No Clear Definition, but Plenty of
Debate, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (August 2, 2011), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/art
icle/corporate-social-responsibility-in-india-no-clear-definition-but-plenty-of-debate/ [https:/
/perma.cc/X2SW-3FPL] (explaining that the rules of CSR are so vague that reporting will be
vague and unsuccessful as well); see also Karnani, supra note 71 (arguing that the CSR law
is ineffective since it does not include an enforcement mechanism, penalties for non-
compliance, or an adequate legal definition).
73. Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Rules §4 (2014).
74. Ministry of Corporate Affairs of India, CSR Expenditure of 5097 Companies for the
F.Y2015-16, http://www.mca.gov.in/MinistryV2/csrdatasummary.html [https://perma.cc/SK
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large firms subject to the CSR mandate failed to contribute the requisite
amount.75 In July 2019, India amended the law, requiring companies to
transfer any unspent amount for ongoing CSR projects to a special account
and spend the amount within three years after transfer. Any unspent amount
not committed to any ongoing CSR project shall be transferred to Prime
Minister’s National Relief Fund or any other fund set up by the central
government for socio-economic development and welfare of minorities and
other disadvantaged groups.76
III. MANDATORYCSRGOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
CSR is a concept often juxtaposed to shareholder wealth maximization.
CSR expects corporations to consider and balance the interests of various
stakeholders in the course of doing business. A progressive way of
implementing such stakeholder-concerned CSR through the law is to require
the corporation’s central decision-making institution (i.e., the board of
directors) to be composed of representatives of various stakeholders. In
other words, shareholders as well as other stakeholders have institutionalized
powers in the corporate governance structure. It is a structural way of
implementing mandatory CSR — addressing CSR concerns through legal
requirements in a corporate governance structure.
An embodiment of this structural approach of mandatory CSR is the so-
called co-determination in which employees have representation at the board
level. For instance, Germany’s Codetermination Act requires companies
with more than 2,000 employees to have half the supervisory board of
directors as representatives of workers. 77 The inclusion of employee-
representatives on the board helps the protection of workers’ rights, which is
an important part of CSR. This co-determination legislation has existed
since World War II, mainly in European countries.
5R-Z9U3].
75. See Dharmapala & Khanna, supra note 67, at 103 (finding that firms that had spent
more than two percent of their net profits on CSR prior to Section 135 actually decreased their
CSR spending after its enactment); see alsoG.K. Kappor & Sanjay Dhamija,Mandatory CSR
Spending – Indian Experience, 3 EMERGINGECON. STUD. 98, 102–03 (2017) (stating that from
2014-2015 56% of companies did not spend the required amount); see also CRISL
FOUNDATION, ALTRUISMRISING: THECRISIL CSRYEARBOOK 6 (2017), https://www.crisil.c
om/content/dam/crisil/crisil-foundation/generic-pdf/CRISIL%20CSR%20year%20Book_Alt
ruism%20rising_30Jan2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3B7-24VS] (finding that in 2016, 133
companies did not spend any money on CSR).
76. The Companies (Amendment) Act, 2019, §135, https://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/p
df/AMENDMENTACT_01082019.pdf [https://perma.cc/2X5Z-HUV6].
77. The main source of the co-determination law is Mitbestimmungsgesetz of 1976.
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A new structural approach, albeit less structurally dramatic, is to require
the establishment of a CSR committee within the corporate governance
structure. The CSR committee is responsible for enacting and supervising
the company’s CSR policies and implementation. South Africa is the
forerunner of this approach.
A. National Experience: South Africa
The development of CSR in South Africa is inextricably linked to the
country’s apartheid history. The institutionalized racial segregation since
1948 gave the white-minority political and economic privileges and deprived
the black majority of fair opportunities. Although apartheid was abolished
more than three decades ago, the country’s large business organizations
remain under the control of the white minority. According to the World
Bank, South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the world, and its
inequality is the persistent legacy of apartheid.78
Since the abolishment of apartheid in 1994, the government has adopted
a series of affirmative action laws to assist the historically disadvantaged
racial group. The most notable example is the Broad-Based Black Economic
Empowerment (BBBEE) Act of 2003, the purposes of which are to
encourage black ownership of business entities and to empower black
employees through human resources and skills development.79 Under the
BBBEE Act, the government encourages companies to be socially
responsible by giving licensing and procurement preferences to BBBEE-
compliant companies.
The abolishment of apartheid introduced not only political and social
liberalization but also economic transformation. With the end of the
international anti-apartheid economic sanctions, South Africa sought to
reintegrate with the global economy through economic reforms. The
improvement of corporate governance was an important part of the reform
scheme. The 1994 King Report on Corporate Governance, which was
created to set good corporate governance standards in South Africa, took a
fresh view that directors should have a responsibility to society rather than
to shareholders only.80 In 2004, the government published a policy paper
78. World Bank,Overcoming Poverty and Inequality in South Africa: An Assessment of
Drivers, Constraints and Opportunities, at 43 (2018), http://documents.worldbank.org/curate
d/en/530481521735906534/pdf/124521-REV-OUO-South-Africa-Poverty-and-Inequality-
Assessment-Report-2018-FINAL-WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6HS-EREG].
79. BBBEE Act § 2 (published on Jan. 9, 2004), https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/
gcis_document/201409/a53-030.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JCU-9VWL].
80. See Philp Armstrong, The King Report on Corporate Governance, 3 JUTA’S Bus.
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that kicked off an extensive overhaul of South African corporate law. The
document emphasized the alignment between corporate purposes and
societal objectives.81
Against this legal background, South Africa adopted a new company
law in 2008. South Africa’s 2008 Companies Act provides that its legislative
purpose is to “promote compliance with the Bill of Rights as provided for in
the Constitution” as well as to “reaffirm the concept of the company as a
means of achieving economic and social benefits.”82 Consistent with the
legislative purpose, the new company law introduces an innovation: “The
Minister, [of Department of Trade and Industry] may by regulation, may
prescribe (a) a category of companies that must each have a social and ethics
committee, if it is desirable in the public interest, having regard to (i) annual
turnover; (ii) workforce size; or (iii) the nature and extent of the activities of
such company.” 83 The Companies Amendment Act (2011) and the
Companies Regulations (2011) further elaborate on the composition,
mandate and powers of the social and ethics committee.
According to the regulations, state-owned companies, listed public
companies, and companies that meet the public interest standard are required
to set up a social and ethics committee.84 The committee must consist of
three directors or prescribed officers.85 The committee must monitor the
company’s performance in five areas: social and economic development;
good corporate citizenship; the environment, health and public safety;
consumer relationships; labor and employment. When the committee
monitors each of these five areas, it has to consider relevant legal rules and
prevailing codes of best practice. The regulations provide example standards
for each of the five areas. 86 When considering “social and economic
development” issues, for instance, the regulations refer to the United Nations
Global Compact Principles, the Employment Equity Act, the BBBEE Act,
etc. In addition to monitoring, the committee has to report to shareholders
at the company’s annual general meeting on matters within its mandate. In
order to fulfil its mandate, the committee is vested with the powers to require
any director or prescribed officer to furnish any information or explanation
65, 68 (1995) (providing a review and the historical background).
81. The title of the policy paper is South African Company Law for the 21st Century—
Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform. For a discussion of the document, see Sulette
Lombard & Tronel Joubert, The Legislative Response to the Shareholders V Stakeholders
Debate: A Comparative Overview, 14 J. CORP. L. STUD. 211, 219–20 (2014).
82. Companies Act 71 of 2008 §7(a), §7(d) (S. Afr.).
83. Id. at §72(4).
84. Companies Regulations, GN R.351 of GG 34239 (26 Apr. 2011).
85. Id.
86. Id.
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necessary for the performance of the committee’s function and to attend any
annual shareholder meeting to address any issues related to its function.87
The Companies and Intellectual Property Commission can issue an order to
a non-compliant company to form a social and ethics committee. 88 To
strengthen the legal status of the social and ethics committee, the South
African government is now considering explicit incorporation of many of the
detailed regulatory rules into its corporate statute.89
Until now, much of the debate about the social and ethics committee
seems to focus on the status of the committee and its relationship with the
board of directors. Scholars are debating whether the social and ethics
committee is a board committee, or a corporate organ separate from the
board.90 In practice, it seems that corporations usually treat it as a board
committee composed of a mix of executive and non-executive directors.
Some companies may include non-directors on the board, such as human
resources executives.91
The initial reaction of the business sector in South Africa was cautious,
and businesses implemented the committee requirement reluctantly. A
survey conducted one year after the law came into effect found that 50% of
the companies subject to the law had not yet established a social and ethics
committee, and only 11% of the companies indicated a strong awareness of
the role and functions of the committee.92 Despite the slow adoption at the
initial stage, almost all the state-owned enterprises and listed and public
interest companies in South Africa now have a social and ethics committee
87. Companies Act 71 of 2008 §72(8) (S. Afr.).
88. Id. at §84(6)-84(7).
89. Companies Amendment Bill 2018, GN 969 of GG 41913 (Sept. 21, 2018), http://ww
w.cipc.co.za/files/7715/4149/0472/Companies_Amendment_Bill_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc
/9AGE-NVU6].
90. For a summary of the debate, see Irene-Marié Esser & Piet Delport, The Protection
of Stakeholders: The South African Social and Ethics Committee and the United Kingdom’s
Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach: Part 2, 50 DE JURE 221, 223–24 (2017). The view
that the social and ethics committee is a board committee is based on the heading of Section
72 and the overall context of Section 72 of the Companies Act, while the view that the
committee is a separate corporate organ is based on the fact that the committee members are
appointed by shareholders, may be composed of non-directors, and directly report to
shareholders.
91. Social and Ethics Committee Report, ILLOVO (May 23, 2014), http://annualreport.il
lovo.co.za/Archive/2014/sustainability/social-and-ethics.asp [https://perma.cc/K35T-WCK
P]; Social and Ethics Committee Report, SPAR (Nov. 14, 2017), https://investor-relations.spar
.co.za/ir2017/governance-approach/social-and-ethics-committee-report/ [https://perma.cc/Z
VS4-WDWZ].
92. DEON ROSSOUW, ETHICS INSTITUTE OF SOUTH AFRICA, THE SOCIAL AND ETHICS
COMMITTEEHANDBOOK, 2 (2012), https://www.tei.org.za/phocadownloadpap/Handbook_too
lkits/SEC%20Handbook%20WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/HZB7-Z3E5].
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in place.93 Although there is no problem with establishing a social and ethics
committee, whether and how the existence of the committee helps CSR
performance remains unclear.94
IV. MANDATORYGENERALCSRDUTY (UNDERCORPORATE LAW)
Over the past decades, CSR has evolved into a comprehensive system
of daily business management.95 As a result, mandatory CSR may refer to a
general legal duty to act in a socially responsible way. Available legal
experiences suggest that such a duty is often established under corporate law.
Exiting corporate law literature tends to equate the CSR duty with part of
directors’ fiduciary duty. This tendency is attributable to the influence of
common law jurisdictions.96 For instance, the UK 2006 Companies Act
requires directors to consider the interests of employees, consumers,
suppliers, the environment, and the community when pursuing the interests
of shareholders. 97 However, less noted is that the CSR duty can be a
corporate obligation rather than merely part of directors’ fiduciary duty. The
corporate statutes of China and Indonesia illustrate this legislative mode,
where the law imposes an apparently broad legal obligation on corporations
to undertake CSR.
A. National Experience (1): China
The key feature of the CSR development in China is state centricity—
93. DEON ROSSOUW, ETHICS INSTITUTE OF SOUTH AFRICA, THE SOCIAL AND ETHICS
COMMITTEE HANDBOOK, SECOND EDITION, 5 (2018), https://www.tei.org.za/phocadownload/
Handbooks_Toolkits/SEC%20Handbook_2nd_Final%20for%20upload_March%202018.pd
f [https://perma.cc/ZVJ2-R5KX].
94. See Esser & Delport, supra note 90, at 232 (reporting no empirical evidence available
regarding the effectiveness of the social and ethics committee).
95. Archie B. Carroll, A History of Corporate Social Responsibility: Concepts and
Practices, in THEOXFORDHANDBOOKOFCORPORATESOCIALRESPONSIBILITY 19, 20 (Andrew
Crane ed., 2008).
96. SeeBenedict Sheehy &Donald Feaver, Anglo-American Directors’ Legal Duties and
CSR: Prohibited, Permitted or Prescribed?, 37 DALHOUSIE L. J. 345, 386–92 (2012)
(comparing whether directors have a CSR duty in Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S.).
97. Companies Act 2006 § 172, c.46 (Eng.); see alsoVirginia E. Harper Ho, Enlightened
Shareholder Value: Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36
J. CORP. L. 59, 78–79, 92 (2010) (explaining how Section 172 mandates greater corporate
social responsibility); see also Andrew R. Keay & Hao Zhang, An Analysis of Enlightened
Shareholder Value in Light of Ex Post Opportunism and Incomplete Law, 8 EUROPEAN
COMPANY&FIN. L. REV. 445, 446–48 (2011) (evaluating whether Section 172 is too vague a
requirement to effectively ensure that directors consider the interests of all stakeholders).
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the state, rather than civil society, playing a central role in advancing CSR.98
This state-centric approach to CSR is the outgrowth of the state’s dominance
in China’s politics, economy and society. China’s economic system is often
characterized as “authoritarian capitalism” or “state capitalism.”99 Political
liberation remains minimal, which suppresses civil society that is supposed
to be a major force pushing for CSR. The state-owned sector remains a
dominant economic power. 100 The state (and ultimately the Chinese
Communist Party) has used its position as a regulator and a controlling
shareholder of state-owned enterprises to promote CSR. The motivation of
the party-state is not simply economic, but more importantly, political. The
party-state views CSR helpful to “social harmony” and ultimately, its ruling
stability.101
The Chinese government has taken numerous measures to promote
CSR. Most of these state-led CSR initiatives are quite recent, dating back to
2006.102 The most salient and representative is probably the CSR provision
in China’s 2006 Company Law. China’s corporate law since its first
adoption in 1993 has been a stakeholder-oriented model in which employees
have representation on the supervisory board.103 The 2006 Company Law
reinforces employee participation in corporate governance by requiring that
at least a third of the supervisory board members be employee
representatives.104 In this regard, China has already had a structural type of
98. See Virginia Harper Ho, Beyond Regulation: A Comparative Look at State-Centric
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law in China, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 375, 378–
79 (2013) (comparing the state-centric model of Corporate Social Responsibility found in
China to the market and relationship driven model found in other parts of the world).
99. Barry Naughton and Kellee S. Tsai eds., STATE CAPITALISM, INSTITUTIONAL
ADAPTATION, AND THECHINESEMIRACLE 1–24 (2015); Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt,We
Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China,
65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 697 (2013); James McGregor, NOANCIENTWISDOM, NO FOLLOWERS:
THECHALLENGES OFCHINESEAUTHORITARIANCAPITALISM 13–15 (2012).
100. See University of Alberta China Institute, State-Owned Enterprises in the Chinese
Economy Today: Role, Reform and Evolution (2018), https://cloudfront.ualberta.ca/-
/media/china/media-gallery/research/policy-papers/soepaper1-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2QSX-WJ8H] (noting how State-Owned Enterprises in China continue to
have an important, yet declining, role in China’s economy).
101. The idea of “harmonious society” was formally adopted in the Fourth Meeting of the
16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (October 11, 2006). See also Li-
Wen Lin, Corporate Social Responsibility in China: Window Dressing or Structural
Change?, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 64, 88 (2010) (discussing the relationship between CSR
and the government’s social harmony policy in China).
102. Ho, supra note 98, at 397.
103. Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 298, 1993, effective July. 1, 1994), arts. 55, 121, Westlaw
China.
104. Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by Standing Comm.
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mandatory CSR for decades. However, empirical evidence often suggests
that employee participation through the supervisory board is merely
superficial.105
More importantly, the 2006 Company Law explicitly requires
corporations to undertake CSR. Article 5 provides that “[i]n the course of
doing business, a company shall comply with laws and administrative
regulations, conform to social morality and business ethics, act in good faith,
subject itself to the government and the public supervision, and undertake
social responsibility.”106 The official legislative documents reveal little to
the public about the motivation of Chinese legislators who decided to adopt
the CSR provision. Nevertheless, some government officials and legal
scholars who were involved in the legislation compiled and published the
opinions considered in the law-making process, which may shed light on the
legislative motivation.107 According to the sources, legislators from different
provinces seemed enthusiastic about incorporating CSR into corporate
law.108 For instance, Shanghai delegates at the National People’s Congress
proposed that the company law should make it clear that “companies shall
protect and improve the interests of other stakeholders in addition to
shareholders.”109 They also proposed that CSR might be included as one of
the legislative purposes of company law.
While there seemed to be little debate about CSR in the legislative
process, controversies arose in the legal community after the enactment of
the CSR provision (i.e., Article 5). The statutory language of Article 5
appears mandatory, yet Chinese law scholars have different interpretations
about the nature of the CSR provision. Some scholars take the CSR
provision as a purely ethical obligation without legal enforceability, because
the corporate statute does not provide any definition for CSR or any remedies
Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), art.52, Westlaw China.
105. See e.g., Weian Li and Chen Hao, An Empirical Research of Supervisory Board
Governance in China’s Listed Companies, 2006 J. SHANGHAIU. FIN. & ECON. 78 (2006) (in
Chinese); Limin Wang and Shiquan Wang, An Empirical Analysis of Supervisory Board
Governance of China’s Private Listed Companies, 11 INQUIRY INTOECON. ISSUES 120 (2007)
(in Chinese).
106. Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), art.5, Westlaw China.
107. Kongtai Cao et al., A RESEARCH REPORT ON THE AMENDMENTS TO COMPANY LAW
(2005) (in Chinese). The Chinese government did not disclose official documents concerning
the legislative history. The editors of this report compiled the opinions considered in the
legislative process. The leading editor was the head of the State Council’s Legislative Affairs
Office, responsible for drafting laws and regulations. Other editors were also affiliated with
the Office; and some are prominent law professors in China.
108. Id., at 21, 141.
109. Id.
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in case of non-compliance.110 In contrast, some scholars see Article 5 as
mandatory in nature.111 They argue that the CSR provision is a fundamental
principle of corporate law; as a fundamental principle, it shall be mandatory
in nature and be applied to interpretations of all provisions throughout the
statute.112 Moreover, they maintain that the corporate statute includes some
specific obligations consistent with the broad CSR principle, such as
employee participation in corporate governance. Other scholars argue that
the CSR provision is both a moral obligation and a legal obligation.113
While the Chinese legal community holds divergent views on the nature
of the CSR provision, it agrees that the CSR law likely has little value in
legal practice. Indeed, Chinese courts rarely apply the law in a legally
consequential way. Nevertheless, it is not useless in judicial decisions. As
I have shown elsewhere, in some cases, Chinese courts used the CSR
provision as an additional legal basis to require companies to comply with
laws; in some cases, the courts used the CSR provision to exhort companies
to go beyond legal compliance, and more importantly, in a few cases, the
courts applied the CSR provision to determine the outcome of judicial
dissolution.114 The courts viewed maintaining “social stability” as part of
CSR and thus denied granting judicial dissolutions that would potentially
cause riots by a large number of employees or customers.115 China’s political
institutions play an important role in this “social stability” interpretation of
CSR. The Chinese government (ultimately the Chinese Communist Party)
suppresses any social unrest that would possibly threaten its ruling stability.
The Chinese courts subject to the Party’s control advance the Party’s
political interests in the name of CSR.116
While judicial application of the CSR provision is generally limited,
there are many specific regulatory measures with a view to implement the
CSR provision in the corporate statute.117 Mandatory sustainability reporting
110. See e.g., Xiaoxing Chen, Rational Consideration on the Legal Rule of Corporate
Social Responsibility: A Comment on Article 5 of Chinese Company Law, in China
Commercial Law Annual 2009, 50–53 (Baoshu Wang eds., 2009) (in Chinese).
111. Junhai Liu, INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION OF NEW COMPANY LAW: LEGISLATIVE AND
JUDICIALCONTROVERSIES, 555 (2006) (in Chinese).
112. Id.
113. See e.g., Jianbo Lou, The Literal Interpretation and Implementation Path of Article
Five Paragraph One of Chinese Company Law, 20 PEKING U. L. J. 36, 36–37 (2008) (in
Chinese).
114. Li-Wen Lin,Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility? Legislative Innovation and
Judicial Application in China, AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/s
ol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3361448 [https://perma.cc/ZD9P-YE2Y].
115. Id. at 35–38.
116. Id. at 44.
117. Id. at 45; Ho, supra note 98, at 382–96.
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is a good example. For instance, in an explicit attempt to further the CSR
provision in company law, the Shanghai Stock Exchange requires certain
types of listed companies to issue annual CSR reports.118 Moreover, many
of the regulatory measures target state-owned enterprises (SOEs). For
instance, the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission (SASAC), the government’s ownership agency, issues the CSR
guidelines for SOEs and requires SOEs to publish annual CSR reports.119
Overall, except for a few judicial cases and specific CSR-related
regulations, the CSR law (i.e., Article 5) as a corporate behavioral standard,
is largely de facto voluntary, despite the mandatory tone of the statute.
B. National Experience (2): Indonesia
Indonesia’s early initiative of mandatory CSR began with the
regulations on state-owned enterprises (SOEs). After independence from
Dutch colonial control in 1945, the Indonesian government sought to gain
economic sovereignty by nationalizing Dutch businesses.120 Since then,
SOEs have played an important role for economic development purposes.
Starting from 1999, every Indonesian SOE is required by law to allocate four
percent of their profit to partnerships with small and medium enterprises and
environmental management programs.121
Unlike the state-owned sector where CSR is driven by the government,
the private sector’s CSR movement is mainly driven from outside Indonesia.
The global anti-sweatshop movement in the 1990s questioned the labor
conditions of multinational companies and their suppliers in Indonesia. As
a result, it raised local awareness of CSR and led to the emergence of CSR-
118. For detailed discussion about the Chinese stock exchanges’ CSR disclosure rules and
implementation effects, see Li-Wen Lin, Corporate Social and Environmental Disclosure in
Emerging Securities Markets, 35 N.C.J. INT’L L. &COM. REG. 1, 18–22 (2009).
119. In 2008, SASAC released the Guiding Opinions on Central Enterprises’
Implementation of Social Responsibility, which required the state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
under the central government’s control to publish CSR reports by 2018. In 2012, SASAC
released an informal notice requiring the central SOEs to begin publishing CSR reports in
2012. All the central SOEs have published annual CSR reports since then.
120. Sinaga, infra note 121.
121. The Ministry of SOEs of Indonesia issued a Minister Decree No. Kep-216/M-
PBUMN/1999, the Law No. 19 of Year 2003 concerning SOEs, and the SOE Ministry
Regulation No. Per-05/MBU/2007 concerning SOE’s partnership with small enterprises and
environmental management programme. See Rifeald Romauli Sinaga, The Indonesian
Government’s Role in the Development of Corporate Social Responsibility in Indonesia, 103
(November 2017) (Ph.D. Thesis, Griffith University) (discussing the Decree and rules
adopted), https://research-repository.griffith.edu.au/handle/10072/370832 [https://perma.cc/
B5H2-6KJR].
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focused NGOs in Indonesia.122
In 2005, the government began a comprehensive revision to its 1995
corporate statute (i.e., Limited Liability Company Act). The 1995 company
law was clearly shareholder-focused, where the legislators adopted
shareholder wealth maximization as the purpose of the corporation and
abandoned any consideration of wider social purposes suggested in the
earlier drafts.123 With shareholder primacy as the accepted principle, the
intended purpose of the 2005 revision was to promote trade, investment and
economic growth. Unsurprisingly, the original draft submitted to the
parliament did not refer to CSR at all. The parliamentary committee
responsible for preparing the final draft held a series of public hearings with
key stakeholders. Representatives of Business Watch Indonesia (BWI), a
prominent CSR-focused NGO in Indonesia, attended one of the hearings and
argued for the inclusion of CSR in the statute.124 After this hearing, BWI
funded a trip to the Netherlands for three parliamentary members to
investigate CSR issues.125 A subsequent parliamentary committee meeting
was held in June 2006, which occurred two weeks after the massive mud
flow pollution caused by a mining corporation owned by Aburizal Bakrie
(then Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare and a key leader of the
Golkar Party, a conservative party).126 In the meeting, various political
factions, including the Golkar’s opponents, supported mandatory CSR in the
law, partly intending to embarrass Bakrie and his party and partly intending
to direct CSR money to the indigenous Indonesian businesses in their own
electoral districts.127
With the agreement on the inclusion of mandatory CSR into the new
corporate law, the parliamentary committee’s deliberation focused on how
much companies should spend on CSR activities. The proposed amount
ranged between three to five percent of a company’s net profit. Several
122. SeeMelody Kemp, Corporate Social Responsibility in Indonesia, Quixotic Dream or
Confident Expectation, UNITED NATIONS RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT,




[https://perma.cc/FUG3-XKSF] (discussing how the anti-sweatshop movement originating
outside Indonesia impacted CSR in Indonesia).
123. Petra Mahy, The Evolution of Company Law in Indonesia: An Exploration of Legal
Innovation and Stagnation, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 377, 412 (2013).
124. Andrew Rosser & Donnie Edwin, The Politics of Corporate Social Responsibility in
Indonesia, 23 PAC. REV. 1, 11–12 (2010).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 12.
127. Id. at 12–13.
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business associations were strongly opposed to mandatory CSR. They
demanded that the parliament abandon the mandatory approach and opt for
a voluntary approach. Consistent with the business sector’s wishes, the
Golkar representatives on the parliamentary committee submitted a proposal
to replace mandatory CSR with a voluntary CSR statement in the law.
However, the committee rejected this proposal. The Golkar representatives
then proposed that mandatory CSR should be limited to natural resources
companies. The committee partially accepted the proposal; it agreed that the
law would be applied to natural resources companies and companies that
have activities connected with natural resources.128
As a result, Article 74 of Limited Liability Company Act, passed in July
2007, provides that: (1) A limited liability company that carries out business
activities in natural resources sectors or in connection with natural resources
is obliged to implement corporate social and environmental responsibility;
(2) The social and environmental responsibility undertaken by the
corporation shall be budgeted and calculated as expenses of the company and
its implementation must be undertaken by considering appropriateness and
reasonableness; (3) Failure to implement the CSR obligation will incur
sanctions in accordance with further regulations.129
Although the business sector failed to stop the law at the legislative
branch, it continued its battle against the mandatory CSR law by resorting to
the constitutional court. Indonesia’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry,
along with certain other associations and companies, jointly filed a judicial
review of Article 74 with the constitutional court. They argued that the law
violated the principle of legal certainty because the CSR mandate would
contradict the voluntary nature of CSR and essentially amount to double
taxation. The court reasoned that the meaning of CSR must be in line with
the culture of each country and therefore that the voluntary nature of CSR is
not universally true.130 Moreover, the court took the position that CSR as a
legal obligation, as opposed to a voluntary initiative, provides more legal
certainty, not less.131 The court also distinguished between taxation and CSR
spending. According to the court, tax levies are used for national
development, while CSR funds are used for communities and the restoration
of the environment where the company is located. The court also explained
128. See Id. (detailing the legislative history leading up to the law).
129. For an English-translated version of the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number
40 of 2007 Concerning Limited Liability Company, see http://dlplawoffices.com/pdf/limited
liabilitycompanies.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NGP-YBCL].
130. Indonesian Constitutional Court Decision No. 53/PUU-VI/2008, available at http://h
ukum.unsrat.ac.id/mk/mk_53_2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/BSD2-ZAFJ].
131. Id.
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that there is no double taxation because the costs incurred for CSR are
calculated as the company’s costs and its implementation ability.132 As a
result, the court upheld the CSR law.
Although the business sector was unsuccessful in defeating the CSR
law at the legislative and judicial review stages, it effectively delayed and
weakened the law at the regulatory implementation stage. 133 The
implementation regulation was belatedly released in 2012, five years after
the CSR legislation. 134 The regulation holds the board of directors
responsible for the practical details of CSR implementation, including the
preparation of annual CSR operations plans and budget plans. However, the
regulation adds little substance to implementation.
The regulation vaguely explains the meaning of “appropriateness and
reasonableness” as being “the financial capacity of the company having
regard to the risks that give rise to the social and environmental
responsibilities that must be borne by the company, subject to the obligations
of the company as set out in the legislation governing the company’s
business operations.” 135 Article 7 of the regulation provides that if a
company fails to fulfil its CSR obligations, it will be sanctioned as prescribed
by laws and regulations in effect. However, the regulation itself imposes no
sanctions. In fact, Article 3 of the regulation provides that “CSR shall be
mandatory for companies that carry on business in the natural resources
sector or related fields, where such CSR obligations are imposed by a
specific sectoral statute.” The regulation echoes the constitutional court’s
view that “CSR has been implicitly regulated by other laws and regulations
such as Forestry Law, Environmental Law, Water Resources Law and the
Law on Gas and Oil,” and administrative sanctions imposed under such laws
serve as an important way to punish companies failing to perform the CSR
obligation under the corporate statute.136 As a result, the CSR obligation
under Article 74 of the Limited Liability Company Act turns out to be no
more than a legal obligation to comply with existing laws and regulations.
132. Id.
133. See Rosser and Edwin, supra note 124, at 8–11, 16–17 (describing the political
dynamics that shaped the introduction of mandatory legal requirements for corporate social
responsibility in Indonesia).
134. Government Regulation, 2012 (Regulation No. 47/2012) (Indon.).
135. Id.
136. Indonesian Constitutional Court, Decision No. 53/PUU-VI/2008 (Indon.). See also
Laurensia Andrini, Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility in Indonesia, 28 MIMBAR
HUKUM 512, 519 (2016) (discussing the various forms of sanctions for when companies fail
to meet their CSR obligations).
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V. EVALUATION
At first glance, the CSR laws appear to be very different from each
other. They emerged in countries with different political, economic and legal
institutions. The laws, even for those similar in type, differ in content in one
way or another. Nevertheless, a deeper analysis reveals some important
commonalities of the apparently different CSR laws.
A. The Impetus of the Law
A comparison of national experiences suggests that governments on the
left wing of the political spectrum play a central role in bringing explicit,
mandatory CSR laws into fruition. China is ruled by a communist party.
The French lawwas passed under the socialist government. Mauritius, India,
and South Africa also passed their CSR laws under left-leaning
governments.137 Left-wing politics generally supports egalitarianism and
public control of major political and economic institutions.138 This political
ideology echoes many CSR issues (e.g., worker welfare and wealth
distribution) and endorses more government intervention in business
activities. A left-leaning political climate makes mandatory CSR laws more
possible.
Although left-wing politics helps, the governments’ immediate
instrumental needs likely play a more important role in mandatory CSR
legislation. The governments when pursuing the laws often had their own
instrumental interests unrelated to the protection of labor, human rights or
the environment. In France, the Cabinet supported the CSR bill mainly to
placate disgruntled fellow party members after the passage of a pro-business
labor law. In Mauritius and India, the governments use the mandatory
philanthropy law to ease their financial burdens for social welfare programs,
while seeking economic liberalization. The Chinese government pursues
social harmony in the name of CSR to maintain its ruling stability. The
Indonesian experience shows that politicians have predatory interests in
redistributing wealth from large foreign and Sino-domestic companies to
indigenous Indonesian businesses in their political network. The national
137. The Alliance Sociale led by the Labor Party won the 2005 general election in
Mauritius. The African National Congress, which is a center-left party, won the 2004 general
election in South Africa. The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Indian National
Congress, generally considered to be on the center-left of Indian politics, formed the
government after obtaining the majority in the 2009 general election.
138. See CHRISTOPHER COCHRANE, LEFT AND RIGHT: THE SMALL WORLD OF POLITICAL
IDEAS 10–33 (2015) (discussing the meaning of left and right).
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experiences reveal a dark side to the governments’ motivation. CSR
literature often portrays the bright side of why governments pursue CSR
policies. For instance, a well-cited World Bank report presents that
governments are driven by the desire to access international markets, attract
foreign investment, improve social and environmental standards, etc. 139
While the positive drivers may play a facilitating role in the policy
background, the national experiences suggest that it is often the dark motives
that give a powerful push in enacting the CSR laws.
The national experiences suggest a North-South divide in the impetus
of such CSR legislation. The French duty of vigilance law reflects aWestern
focus on human rights violations and resonates with the United Nation’s call
for business responsibility and human rights.140 In contrast, the CSR laws in
the developing countries including China, Mauritius, India and South Africa
focus on national development rather than human rights concerns in
globalization. By mandating CSR, the developing-country governments
seek resources from corporations to alleviate the development burden.
In addition to the political interests of governments, the advocacy of
NGOs plays an important role in some of the countries. In France, a coalition
of NGOs initiated the bill and sustained it throughout the legislative process,
which was critical to its passage in the face of strong lobbying power of large
corporations. In Indonesia, an NGO triggered the idea of writing CSR into
the corporate law bill in a public hearing, and the NGO also funded a number
of parliamentary members to become familiarized with CSR issues.
Moreover, the occurrence of corporate disasters as a result of irresponsible
conduct created a timely and favorable policy climate that accelerated the
lawmaking progress in both of these countries. As NGOs usually have
limited resources relative to big corporations, the external events gave the
civil sector more legitimacy currency to buy support from politicians.
Compared to the political interests of the governments, the type of the
pre-existing corporate law has limited explanatory power for the rise of the
progressive CSR laws. Intuitively, mandatory CSR legislation appears more
compatible with a stakeholder-oriented corporate law. France and China
give support to this proposition. They have had institutionalized employee
participation at the board level long before their recent CSR laws. Mauritius
and South Africa had a shareholder-centered corporate statute, though they
adopted a stakeholder-oriented code of corporate governance years prior to
139. TOM FOX ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR ROLES IN STRENGTHENING CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: A BASELINE STUDY (World Bank Group, 2002), http://documents.worldban
k.org/curated/en/284431468340215496/Public-sector-roles-in-strengthening-corporate-socia
l-responsibility-a-baseline-study [https://perma.cc/69YV-N6R4].
140. RBC Group, infra note 163.
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the mandatory CSR law. India’s mandatory CSR provision in the corporate
statute was adopted contemporaneously with other amended provisions that
expressly recognize various stakeholders. Indonesia’s corporate law prior to
the mandatory CSR provision focused on shareholders only, with the
adoption of a stakeholder-oriented corporate governance code just a few
months before the enactment of the mandatory CSR law.141 The national
experiences indicate that a stakeholder-oriented corporate law is not a
precondition for the rise of progressive CSR law, and neither is a pre-existing
shareholder-focused corporate law a hurdle to the emergence of progressive
CSR law.
B. The Scope of Corporations Subject to the Law
The scope of corporations under the recent explicit CSR laws varies
across countries. The legislative histories in the examined countries indicate
that there was little discussion about the scope of corporations subject to the
law. It is unclear how the legislators determined which companies should
assume the legal obligation of CSR. Often, the laws target large companies.
The focus on large corporations has some merits. As large corporations have
greater impact on society, there may be a greater need to regulate large
corporations. In addition, large corporations, compared to small ones, have
more resources to engage in CSR. However, the determination of the size
threshold appears arbitrary rather than based on any rational analysis. For
instance, it is unclear why the French vigilance duty uses the number of
employees rather than revenues or other indicators as the threshold to trigger
the obligation of human rights and environmental protection. 142 As
illustrated, the Indonesian experience provides a vivid example that the
scope of corporations covered by the law is determined by politics rather
than any rationality.143
Besides large corporations, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are another
141. The corporate governance code was adopted in October 2006; the corporate statute
was adopted in August 2007.
142. The French duty of vigilance uses the number of employees as the threshold, while
the UK Modern Slavery Act applies a turnover threshold. France’s legislation to implement
the EU directive on the disclosure of non-financial information including the transposing
order of 19 July 2017 and Law n° 2016-1691 of 9 December 2016 on transparency, anti-
corruption and the modernization of economic life use the threshold of both the turnover and
the number of employees. See Stéphane Brabant & Elsa Savourey, Scope of the Law on the
Corporate Duty of Vigilance, 50 REVUE INTERNATIONALEDE LACOMPLIANCE ETDE L’ÉTHIQUE
DES AFFAIRES [INT’L REV. COMPLIANCE & BUS. ETHICS] 1, 2 (2017) (discussing the use of
number of employees as a criterion for triggering CSR obligations).
143. For the relevant discussion, see Section IV.B.
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target group. The CSR laws in China, South Africa, and Indonesia
specifically refer to SOEs. The linkage between SOEs and CSR is
unsurprising. SOEs have been known for pursing non-economic goals in
addition to (or sometimes other than) profits. Governments often use SOEs
to achieve objectives such as providing public goods, improving labor
relations, encouraging national economic development and industrialization,
etc. The inclusion of SOEs in the CSR laws reflects this governmental
orientation. In addition, the CSR laws may provide SOEs (ultimately the
government) with a legitimate excuse for their financial performance that is
often inferior to their counterparts in the private sector.144
C. The Definition of CSR
A common theme of the explicit CSR laws is that CSR (or its
synonyms) is often undefined or unclear in the statutes. The laws in China
and Indonesia simply require companies to undertake “CSR” without giving
any definition of CSR. The courts in China and Indonesia suggest a context-
dependent approach to CSR, where the meaning of CSR depends on the
organizational, cultural, and national contexts. On the one hand, a context-
dependent approach makes sense from a business management perspective
because it considers the different needs of business organizations. On the
other hand, it may be open to abuse by the government, especially when the
rule of law is not well established to keep the government’s power in check.
The government may easily justify its intervention in business management
for the sake of CSR. For instance, as noted, Chinese courts in the name of
CSR refused to grant judicial dissolutions for fear of mass protests. A
context-dependent approach to CSR provides business flexibility, but at the
same time, it may add legal and political unpredictability.
Given that scholars and international organizations such as the United
Nations and the European Union have provided many CSR definitions ready
to use, why did the legislators prefer to leave it blank? On the one hand, the
lack of definition may be a result of the lack of genuine intention to
implement the law. On the other hand, great vagueness seems inevitable
despite efforts to define CSR. Mauritius and India provide a list of CSR
activities. Yet the named activities such as “poverty alleviation” programs
144. See e.g., SEA-JIN CHANG & SANDY YUAN JIN, THE PERFORMANCE OF STATE OWNED
ENTERPRISES INCHINA:ANEMPIRICALANALYSIS OFOWNERSHIPCONTROLTHROUGHSASACS
22–25 (2016) (researching the historical performance of SOEs in China in reference to various
reforms); EmitaW. Astami et al., The Effect of Privatization on Performance of State‐Owned‐
Enterprises in Indonesia, 18 ASIAN REV. ACCT. 5, 6–19 (2010) (discussing how Indonesian
SOEs have been effected by CSR legislation).
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remain vague. The lack of definition is a common critique of the explicit
CSR laws. 145 As explained below, it does pose great challenges to the
implementation and the function of these laws.
D. The Implementation of the Law
A review of the national experiences shows that effective
implementation of the CSR laws is a very challenging task. To be sure, it
may be too early to judge given that many of the CSR laws have only recently
come into existence. Nevertheless, there are serious concerns about future
implementation.
As illustrated, the mandatory CSR laws often experienced a difficult
legislative journey. The laws faced strong opposition from the business
sector, which is unsurprising, as the laws explicitly target corporations,
especially large corporations with lobbying prowess. Mandatory CSR
obligations were significantly watered downed after the legal battles. In
France, the general CSR duty and the reversal of burden of proof proposed
in the original bill were completely gone and replaced by a vigilance plan.
The final law provides no regulatory monitoring over whether the company
adequately implements the legal requirements. In India, the compulsory
nature of CSR spending is compromised by the comply-or-explain approach.
In Indonesia, the implementation regulations were long delayed and, when
finally promulgated, too vague to provide any meaningful guidance for
implementation. All the CSR laws provide little or no government
monitoring over implementation. Consequentially, the mandatory CSR laws
permit superficial implementation.
Moreover, as noted, when pursuing the CSR laws, the governments are
often motivated more by political self-interests than by the pursuit of
social/environmental justice. When the motivation is to shame political
opponents or to appease fellow party members, the implementation of the
CSR laws depends on the vagaries of politics. Politicians may tend to exploit
the immediate political value of CSR without giving serious thought to its
long-term enforcement.
145. See e.g., Patricia Rinwigati Wassgstein, The Mandatory Corporate Social
Responsibility in Indonesia: Problems and Implications, 98 J. BUS. ETHICS 455, 461 (2011)
(“Without the clear clarification that such a regulation would provide, Article 74 is more
inspirational in character than it is any kind of operational regulation”);
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, supra note 72; Peixin Luo, Woguo Gongsi Shehui Zeren De Sifa
Caipan Kunjing Ji Ruogan Jiejue Silu [The Judicial Adjudication Dilemma and Several
Solutions for Corporate Social Responsibility in China], 12 LEGAL SCI. 66 (2007) (China)
(arguing that Chinese courts are unlikely to apply the CSR law given its vagueness).
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Explicit CSR legislation is a politically attractive tool for politicians to
promote their self-interests. The explicit reference to CSR or its synonyms
makes politicians feel that they are making a “good” law. Moreover, explicit
mandatory CSR legislation generates favorable political publicity and easily
impresses the public. Politicians may use it as an expedient way to signal
their commitments to social and environmental issues. They may be more
concerned with political signaling than actual implementation of the law,
especially when lack of legal enforcement is a taken-for-granted systematic
problem, often in developing countries. It poses little to no extra harm to
politicians’ credibility when the vast body of law is already infamous for lack
of enforcement.
Besides politics, the inherently open-ended nature of CSR leaves great
room for manipulation. As illustrated, the laws often deal with broad and
diverse legal issues (e.g., social, environmental, human rights issues). The
goal appears ambitious – wishing to hold corporations responsible for a wide
spectrum of their behavior through one statutory instrument. This ambition
comes at a price: vague statutory language. Meanwhile, the business reality
that there is no one-size-fits-all CSR strategy requires some vagueness to
accommodate diverse needs of corporations. This suggests a great limitation
on the residual lawmaking and enforcement functions undertaken by
regulators and courts.146 It would be unlikely for regulators to proactively
stipulate CSR standards suitable for each company, and it would be often
inappropriate for judges to substitute their own opinions for CSR policies
made by corporate managers. Even if possible, the interpretation and
specification of a highly vague CSR law would place high demands on legal
infrastructure, which is particularly challenging for developing countries. As
a result, in practice, corporations would have great discretion in interpreting
and implementing the law.
In China and Indonesia, companies are required by law to undertake a
broad CSR duty, while CSR is completely undefined in the statute. In
France, the duty of vigilance law requires companies to have a plan to
identify and prevent “violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms,”
“serious harm to health and safety,” and “environmental damage.” The law
leaves wide discretion to corporations to determine what these terms mean
when constructing the vigilance plan. In Mauritius and India, while the
regulators provide categories of permitted CSR programs, such categories
146. See generally Katherina Pistor &ChenggangXu, Incomplete Law, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L
L. & POL’Y 931 (2003) (discussing law being inherently incomplete). According to the
incomplete law theory of Professors Pistor andXu, when law is highly incomplete, the optimal
allocation of the residual lawmaking and enforcement powers depends on the extent of
expected harm and the costs of standardizing actions that might cause harm. Id. at 951–54.
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are broadly stated, such as programs for “eradicating hunger and poverty” or
“educational support.” In practice, companies have great freedom to
characterize their CSR activities as one of these categories. In South Africa,
each company’s CSR committee enjoys liberty to decide the concrete
meaning and relevant measures of “labor and employment” and “the
environment, health and public safety,” etc. In short, while the CSR laws
impose a legal duty to undertake CSR, they often leave companies to decide
what CSR means at the implementation stage. Consequentially, the
compulsory nature of such CSR laws would be significantly diluted.
E. The Function of the Law
The purpose of the CSR laws is presumably to make corporations more
socially responsible. Yet, it remains unclear whether the recent progressive
forms of CSR legislation have made corporations any more responsible
toward society or the environment. Part of the reason is that it is very
difficult to measure social and environmental outcomes.147 Moreover, there
is little evidence that the laws have effectively performed any regulatory or
adjudicative function to force corporations to change behavior. Regulatory
enforcement remains sparse or even lacking entirely. Judicial cases are very
rare. When courts do apply the CSR laws, as demonstrated in China and
Indonesia, they hesitate to impose any additional legal burden on
corporations beyond compliance with existing laws and regulations. As
noted, the French court interpreted the duty of vigilance as a commercial
matter, indicating judicial deference to corporate management.
Up to now, the function of the CSR laws seems largely expressive. The
expressive function operates in two ways. In one way, as noted, the laws
serve political signaling purposes. The laws with explicit reference to CSR
or its synonyms provide politicians an expedient and high-profiled way to
demonstrate to the public (or their constituents) that they are doing
something good to society and nature. The laws are intended to deliver
political symbolic value. In another way, which is good, the legal signaling
may potentially reconstruct existing business norms and change the social
meaning of appropriate corporate behavior. 148 The effectiveness of the
norm-changing function through a legal expression significantly depends on
the legitimacy of the state and the consistency of messages sent by the
147. See Galit A. Sarfaty, Regulating through Numbers: A Case Study of Corporate
Sustainability Reporting, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 575, 621 (2013) (showing the problems and
challenges of constructing quantitative CSR indicators).
148. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2031
(1996).
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government.149 In this regard, the national experiences unfortunately suggest
that the norm-changing function may be quite limited. The adopters tend to
be developing countries, and their governments do not have a reputation of
effective enforcement of their pre-existing labor, environmental, and human
rights laws. Although France is not afflicted by the systematic enforcement
problem, its government passed the duty of vigilance law in the midst of
labor law reforms that were viewed by many to favor business at the expense
of labor.150 As a result, the governments’ signaling of CSR commitment is
at best ambiguous or at worst deceitful.
In addition, the expressive function of the CSR laws does not
necessarily work in a way that increases CSR activities at the firm level. Part
of the expressive function of the law is that the law provides a focal point
around which firms structure their behavior.151 As the Indian experience
shows, while companies that initially spent less than two per cent of their net
profit increased their CSR spending after the law was passed, companies that
originally contributed more than the two per cent threshold reduced their
CSR expenditures after the law was passed. 152 Firms converge on the
minimum legal standard, and the two per cent threshold becomes an anchor,
putting a floor and a ceiling on CSR activities.153 Law is helpful to set
minimum standards to provide behavioral guidance. Yet, in some cases, law
may not be useful to prescribe best practices because it incurs the risk of
crowding out intrinsic motivations for continuous improvement154 and/or
raises the problem of using aspirational language that is difficult for courts
or regulators to enforce.
F. The Relationship Between the Laws and Beyond
Scholars often use soft/hard law categories to characterize the nature of
CSR initiatives.155 In this regard, the recent CSR laws fall into the category
149. Ho, supra note 98, at 434.
150. The labor law reform caused mass protests of students, workers and unions in France.
Lucien Libert andMorade Azzouz,Hundreds of Thousands Protest at French Labor Reforms,
REUTERS (March 31, 2016).
151. Richard H. McAdams, Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649,
1654–71 (2000).
152. Dharmapala and Khanna, supra note 67.
153. Dharmapala and Khanna, supra note 67.
154. For the literature on extrinsic incentives crowding out intrinsic motivations, see e.g.,
Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15–16 (2000)
(discussing how fines may not yield the intended results depending on social circumstances
and incentives).
155. For the distinction between hard law and soft law, see Kenneth W. Abbott and
Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’LORG. 421, 421–23
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of “soft hard law,”156 in that they appear to be hard law that imposes legal
obligations on corporations but turn out to be soft in nature because of vague
behavioral requirements and weak compliance mechanisms. Governments
may use multiple “soft hard laws” to promote CSR. The different types of
explicit CSR legislation are not mutually exclusive; in fact, they often co-
exist with each other. As illustrated, France has mandatory CSR disclosure
and mandatory CSR due diligence; 157 Indonesia adopts mandatory
philanthropy for SOEs and imposes a general CSR duty on companies
related to the natural resources sector; China requires corporations to engage
in CSR reporting and undertake a general CSR obligation. Having multiple
“soft hard laws” might increase the chances of norm change. Nevertheless,
it is doubtful that multiple “soft hard laws” have comparable effects to a
“hard hard law” that has precise behavior requirements and rigorous
enforcement. It cautions against using the recent CSR laws as substitutes for
regulatory modes that require specific and substantive performance, though
the CSR laws may have a complementary role to play through promoting
CSR norms.
The Total case in France, discussed previously, is illuminating for the
relationship between the broad CSR law and other specific laws. Total’s
statement highlighted the general nature of the French duty of vigilance law,
distinct from the specific duty to conduct environmental impact assessments
for individual projects arising from other areas of law such as environmental
regulations.158 As explained, the CSR laws tend to be broad and ambitious,
seeking to regulate social, labor, environmental, human rights and many
other issues through one legal instrument. This broad approach may be
useful for raising general awareness, but it runs the risks of symbolic
(2000).
156. Marcel Brus, Soft Law in Public International Law: A Pragmatic or a Principled
Choice? Comparing the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement, in LEGAL
VALIDITY AND SOFT LAW 243, 263 (Pauline Westerman eds., 2018).
157. As early as 1977, France was the pioneer of mandatory corporate social reporting that
required large companies to disclose detailed information on employment, salaries, training,
hygiene, job security, industrial relationships and other working conditions. In 2001, France
was the first country in the world that required listed companies to disclose wide-ranging
social and environmental information about their activities. In 2012, France made the
disclosure obligations more comprehensive, requiring listed and unlisted companies with a
physical presence in France to disclose information under 32 social, environmental, and
governance indicators. Lucien J. Dhooge, Beyond Voluntarism: Social Disclosure and
France’s Nouvelles Regulations Economiques, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 441, 443–45
(2004); Jonathan Morris, The Five W’s of France’s CSR Reporting Law, BSR (July 2012), ht
tps://www.bsr.org/reports/The_5_Ws_of_Frances_CSR_Reporting_Law_FINAL.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/8KRG-TGS2].
158. Friends of the Earth, supra note 33.
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implementation and lax enforcement on the ground. It is questionable that
any one single government bureau would have requisite expertise and
resources to assess and monitor such a wide range of corporate behavior. To
the extent that specific corporate performance is required, it probably entails
specific legal requirements under specialized laws, such as topic-focused,
industry-specific, geography-targeted and behavior-specified regulations.
G. The Reform of the Law
The CSR laws, as they currently stand, have great limitations in forcing
responsible corporate behavior. Nevertheless, considering that many laws
began with tentative designs and compromises with politics but gradually
improved over time, the recent CSR laws might be viewed optimistically as
an experimental step toward development of better CSR legislation in the
future. With this positive view, how could the laws be improved? As
examined, the CSR laws generally lack government monitoring, legal
punishment for non-compliance, and/or any remedial mechanisms for
stakeholders. Accordingly, the laws may be strengthened along with these
issues. Beyond the general directions, different regulatory modes have
different specific issues to be addressed.
Mandatory CSR due diligence focuses on the importance of risk
identification and prevention plans. The corporation’s statements on risk
mapping and prevention policies, like other corporate reports such as
financial/CSR annual reports, should be verified by an independent third
party. However, the current mode of mandatory CSR due diligence as
adopted in France does not require any independent auditing but merely
relies on ex post litigation by victims to enforce the law. Given that the main
purpose of due diligence is to prevent harm, independent verification is an
important ex ante safeguard.
The legislative purpose of mandatory philanthropy is mainly concerned
with helping socio-economic disadvantaged groups in the local community.
It is important to ensure that corporations spend funding on such purposes
and not hide regular business expenses (e.g., employee compensation) under
the category of CSR. Transparency is an important monitoring device.
However, the mandatory philanthropy legislation as adopted in India and
Mauritius has few disclosure requirements. The law should require
corporations to provide a detailed annual report of the requisite philanthropy
spending subject to third party auditing.
Both the mandatory CSR committee legislation as adopted in South
Africa and the mandatory CSR duty as adopted in China and Indonesia
embed the CSR obligation in corporate law. Although the CSR legislation
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is presumably to protect non-shareholders such as employees, consumers,
communities, etc., none of the corporate statutes in these adopting countries
provide stakeholders with legal rights to challenge the board of directors or
the corporation in case of any breaches of the CSR obligation. The law can
be strengthened through empowering non-shareholders affected by corporate
actions to bring lawsuits against the board or the corporation for breaches of
their CSR duty. More importantly, similar to the fiduciary duty in corporate
law, CSR is “a residual concept that can include factual situations that no
one has foreseen and categorized.”159 The judicial determination of whether
the corporation/the board meets the general CSR obligation under corporate
law requires many institutional supports including, but not limited to,
incentives for plaintiffs and attorneys to bring lawsuits; judges and attorneys
conversant with how to apply broadly stated principles; courts capable of
fashioning remedies without clear judicial guidance.160 Given that CSR is
inherently a context-specific concept, policymakers when adopting such
legislation should not be preoccupied with drafting a perfect definition of
CSR. They should focus on institutional capacity building to deliver the
concrete meaning sensitive to the context of each case.161
H. The Diffusion of the Law
There seems to be some regional diffusion of the aforementioned CSR
laws. After France, some European countries such as Switzerland and the
Netherlands are now considering a version of mandatory CSR due diligence.
Mandatory philanthropy was first adopted in Mauritius and then in India and
Nepal. Geographical proximity appears to play a role in the diffusion of the
CSR laws. As noted, mandatory CSR disclosure is now adopted globally.
Do any of the new types of CSR legislation potentially have similar
popularity? While politicians around the world may find the various forms
of explicit CSR legislation attractive for some reason (good or bad),
institutional factors suggest that the CSR laws may have divergent diffusion
patterns.
The institutional theory in sociology suggests that there may be
normative, coercive and mimetic forces that potentially lead to a wide
adoption of mandatory CSR due diligence.162 The United Nations as an
159. ROBERTCHARLESCLARK, CORPORATE LAW, 141 (1986).
160. Lin, supra note 114.
161. Lin, supra note 114.
162. For the three diffusion mechanisms, see Paul J. DiMaggio andWalter W. Powell, The
Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational
Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 150–54 (1983).
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international norm setter recommends CSR due diligence as part of the best
practices on human rights protection in the United Nations Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights. To implement the UN’s
principles, in March 2019, the European Parliament’s Responsible Business
Conduct Working Group launched a plan for an EU law requiring companies
to carry out human rights due diligence regarding their operations,
investments, business relationships and supply chains. 163 Moreover,
policymakers in the face of increased political and economic uncertainty tend
to emulate measures taken by leading countries. Accordingly, policymakers
who are uncertain about CSR policies may copy laws from countries that are
perceived as CSR leaders, often developed countries such as France and
other European countries.
In comparison, the diffusion of mandatory philanthropy legislation, if it
occurs at all, is likely among developing countries only. Mandatory
philanthropy is particularly attractive to developing countries whose
governments have difficulties in meeting basic community needs.
Developed countries usually do not have such problems, and they often have
a sophisticated NGO sector to help. Moreover, as modern CSR now focuses
on comprehensive risk management and downplays or even discredits
corporate charity, mandatory philanthropy is unlikely to pass muster in
developed countries that have more advanced understanding of CSR.
Unlike mandatory philanthropy, mandatory general CSR duty and
mandatory CSR board committees have a better chance to travel across the
institutional contexts of developed and developing countries. As noted,
various forms of mandatory general CSR duty under corporate law have
emerged in both developing (obviously China and Indonesia) and developed
countries. The initial goal of France’s duty of vigilance law was to impose
a general CSR duty on corporations. Moreover, some developed countries
such as the U.K. have already had a version of mandatory CSR duty by
incorporating CSR concerns into directors’ fiduciary duty. Likewise,
although until now the mandatory requirement of CSR board committees
exists only in South Africa, the international community is quite familiar
with this regulatory mode in corporate governance. Mandatory CSR board
committees can be viewed as part of the international trend of using
mandatory special board committees (such as audit committee,
compensation committee, nomination committee, etc.) to solve particular
163. The Responsible Business Conduct Working Group (RBC Group) of the European
Parliament, Shadow EU Action Plan on the Implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights within the EU (March 19, 2019), https://responsiblebusinesscon
duct.eu/wp/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/SHADOW-EU-Action-Plan-on-Business-and-Hum
an-Rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9UL-NLE7].
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corporate governance concerns. 164 This institutional familiarity may
increase the likelihood of widespread acceptance.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, CSR is not merely a business word but a legal term. The legal
importance of CSR will likely continue to rise with the increasing threats of
climate change and social inequality around the world. The enthusiasm for
explicit CSR legislation seems real and growing. Explicit CSR legislation
looks appealing, politically and morally. However, it is challenging to make
it legally effective. It is fraught with conceptual contradictions and
vagueness, subject to political confrontation, and requires deep commitment.
Mandatory CSR disclosure is widely recognized as a weak form of
regulation, as it does not mandate any substantive social or environmental
performance. At first glance, the recent emergent forms of explicit CSR
legislation seem more progressive than mandatory CSR disclosure.
However, a close look at the national experiences shows that the laws are not
as “hard” as they appear. Optimistically, the recent legal innovations of CSR
may strengthen CSR awareness and reshape business norms.
Pessimistically, they may be merely window dressing legislation.
164. Jason Royce Fichtner, The Recent International Growth of Mandatory Audit
Committee Requirements, 7 INT’L J. DISCLOSURE&GOV. 227, 227–29 (2010).
